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IMAGINING BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS WITHOUT 
AGENCY LAW
PAULA J. DALLEY*
The intractable normative question, “whom should corporate managers 
serve?” has a legal corollary: for whom are corporate managers agents?  The law has 
always been clear about this: a corporate agent acts on behalf of the corporation as 
her principal.  The legal status of the board of directors is a little trickier: neither each 
director individually nor the board as a whole is legally an agent of the corporation.  
Rather, the board has a rather unique position as statutory caretaker.  Because it is 
the supreme spokesperson for the corporation, the board provides the “control” of a 
principal over the corporate agents.  However, it is clear that the board is not the 
principal, and the corporate agents do not act on the board’s behalf.  Although the 
agency status of corporate officers and other employees is legally clear, the law does 
not help solve the practical problems that arise when one’s principal is an insensate 
legal person.  If, as most scholars today assert, the corporation is best viewed as a 
nexus of contracts, then the identification of the principal is even more difficult. 
In partnerships and limited liability companies, which I will refer to generally 
as “entities,” the governing statutes have adopted agency law in its entirety.  The 
statutes state that partners, members, and managers (collectively “managers”) are 
agents of the entity.1  Thus, the principal is, as in the case of the corporation, an 
insensate legal person, but in an entity there is no person or body such as the board 
of directors with ultimate authority to speak for the principal.  This leaves the entity 
(the principal) in the awkward position of being unable to control or authorize its 
agents, except through other agents whom it cannot control or authorize.  To some 
degree, the entity statutes solve this problem by specifying a range of actions that all 
entity managers are authorized to perform on behalf of the (dumb) principal.2  The 
revised Limited Liability Act rejected this approach, however, so it is conceivable 
that an LLC will have no authorized agents at all.3
* Professor of Law, Oklahoma City University.  The author thanks Joan Heminway and Barry 
Johnson for helpful comments, but retains responsibility for errors and bad arguments. 
1See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 301, 6(I) U.L.A. 101 (1997); UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 301, 6B U.L.A. 585 
(1996). See also REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT, 6B U.L.A. 469 (2006) (see comment expressly 
rejecting agency language, although it does not necessarily reject the application of agency law to 
members or managers of LLCs). 
2 See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §301. 
3 See Thomas E. Rutledge & Steven G. Frost, RULLCA Section 301: The Fortunate Consequences (and 
Continuing Questions) of Distinguishing Apparent Agency and Decisional Authority, 64 BUS. LAW. 37, 51 (2008). 
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These practical and theoretical difficulties suggest that perhaps we need to 
reevaluate the nature of the relationships involved in business associations of all 
kinds.4  Is there another way to think about those relationships that more 
appropriately reflects the expectations of the parties?  In this paper, I propose an 
“asset-pool” approach to business associations.  Agency law concepts are 
appropriate for natural persons who can manifest consent and exercise control in the 
ways envisioned by agency law, but these same concepts are ill-suited for entities.  
Under the alternative asset-pool approach, the asset pool is only the bearer of 
liabilities; while various natural persons have rights, duties, and obligations with 
respect to the asset pool and each other.5  There is no principal-agent relationship 
among the natural persons or between the natural persons and the asset pool.  This 
approach thus avoids the absurdity of locating rights and powers in fictitious legal 
persons.  The model for this set of relationships is not agency law, but rather ancient 
forms of business association. 
One well-known example of ancient asset-based liability is the Roman family.  
The family was the basic unit of social intercourse in Rome, and all family property 
was owned by a single human, the paterfamilias.6  Everyone and everything belonging 
to the family, including the wife, sons, daughters, sons’ wives, adopted children, and 
slaves, was said to be in patria potestas – the power of the father.7  The offensiveness 
of this system to modern sensibilities perhaps obscures the fact that this institution 
was actually a bundle of assets under the control of a single decision-maker.  The 
paterfamilias was liable for everything that was done by those in his power8 – that is, 
those who were using the assets in the bundle.  But it was the family property, not 
4 Professor Larry Ribstein has persuasively argued that agency law should be delinked from 
partnership law, and that partnership law should develop its own rules that are appropriate for its 
nature.  Larry E. Ribstein, Are Partners Agents?, 3-5 (Ill. Law and Econ. Research Paper Series, 
Research Paper No. LE08-004, Jan. 18, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1086745.  Since 
partnerships are creatures of contract, the law of the partnership can be, and perhaps ideally would be, 
determined by the partners themselves.  Even so, law must provide default rules and rules governing 
relations between the partners or the partnership and third parties. 
5 This approach bears some similarity to the nexus-of-contracts conception of the corporation.  There 
is an important distinction, however.  The nexus-of-contracts approach considers a variety of 
contracts between many parties interested in the corporation – that is why it is a “nexus”.  Here, I am 
interested in only two contracts: the contract between the contributors and the managers and the 
contract regulating relations among the contributors themselves.  Moreover, these two contracts do 
not intersect in any meaningful way for my purposes. 
6 See J. INST. 2.9.1-2 (J.B. Moyle trans.); ANDREW STEPHENSON, A HISTORY OF ROMAN LAW 340-41 
(1912).
7 J. INST. 2.9.1-2; STEPHENSON, supra note 6, at 340-41. 
8 See J. INST. 2.9.1-2, 4.7.6-8; STEPHENSON, supra note 6, at 340-41. 
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the paterfamilias, that bore the liability for the actions of the sons and slaves.9  The 
asset-pool theory explains the peculiar doctrine of noxal liability, which seems 
aberrant to modern eyes.  Noxal liability permitted a paterfamilias to turn over a 
wrongdoing slave to the victim rather than paying for the injury.10  Thus, noxal 
liability permitted the paterfamilias to remove the offending asset from the pool. 
In addition, asset segregation was available in the Roman family:11  The 
paterfamilias was permitted to set aside a pool of assets (the peculium) to be used by his 
sons or slaves in a separate enterprise.12  Liabilities arising from that enterprise were 
limited to the assets in the peculium.13  The peculium itself, however, was owned by the 
paterfamilias.14  As noted, the actions of all those in patria potestas bound the 
paterfamilias, so that sons and slaves functioned somewhat like agents, but the liability 
of the paterfamilias arose from the ownership of the relevant property.15  The family 
was not the only bundle of assets recognized in Roman law, however.  The state, the 
emperor, and the church16 held property in their own names and were subject to 
rights and obligations with respect to that property.17  The estate of a deceased 
9 See J. INST. 2.9.1-2, 4.7.6-8; STEPHENSON, supra note 6, at 340-41.  Note, however, that because the 
family property was owned by the paterfamilias, this distinction would have no practical effect. 
10 See J. INST. 4.8. 
11 If the liability arose in a business activity, the liability might be limited in some circumstances to the 
assets related to the business.  See generally David Johnston, Limiting Liability: Roman Law and the Civil 
Law Tradition, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1515, 1519-22 (1995) (discussing how a creditor who brought an 
actio de peculio against a paterfamilias based on an obligation made by the actions of a son or a slave 
could only recover up to the amount in the peculium, regardless of whether this value was the full 
extent of the debtor’s obligation). 
12 In addition, a son’s military earnings, and later his earnings from a profession, were held in a 
separate peculium. See STEPHENSON, supra note 6, at 396-97. 
13 See Johnston, supra note 11, at 1516, 1521-22. 
14 Id.
15 Id. at 1526-27 (discussing liability based on the peculio).  Johnston argues that the general liability of 
the paterfamilias with respect to the family assets in general is based on consent because the paterfamilias
put the son or slave in charge of the business.  See id. at 1520-21.  See also MAX WEBER, THE HISTORY 
OF COMMERCIAL PARTNERSHIPS IN THE MIDDLE AGES 85-91 (Lutz Kaelber trans. 2003) (discussing 
the family as holder of common property generally). 
16 This was permitted by Constantine’s Edict of Milan in 313.  See CHARLES NORRIS COCHRANE,
CHRISTIANITY AND CLASSICAL CULTURE 197 (Oxford Univ. Press 1944) (1940).  See The Internet 
Medieval Source Book, Medieval Sourcebook: Galerius and Constantine: Edicts of Toleration 311, 
313, available at http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/edict-milan.html, for an English translation 
of the Edict. 
17 See STEPHENSON, supra note 6, at 375. 
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person was held as a universitas iuris,18 which contained all the assets of the decedent 
and which would usually pass in its entirety to its new owner.19
The best, although less well-known, model for the asset-pool theory of 
business associations is the medieval commenda.20  To create a commenda, an investor 
transferred custody of specific property, such as goods or cash, to a trader, who took 
the property abroad to engage in business.21  The trader had complete discretion22
with respect to the commenda (the assets), based on the original agreement.  In the 
commenda, only the trading assets were put at risk.23  The asset pool could include a 
share in another pool of goods or in a ship, or could be created by the trader from 
the combined goods of several investors.24  The original agreement provided for a 
division of profits between the investor and the trader; this was usually 75-percent to 
the contributor and 25-percent to the trader, but it could vary.25
How would an asset-pool theory of business associations work today?  The 
first requirement for this approach is an identifiable pool of assets to serve as the 
focus of business conduct.26  Every form of business association other than a sole 
proprietorship has such a pool.27  It is the creation of the pool – by the contribution 
of property to the entity or the subscription for shares – that creates the association 
18 This is sometimes said to be a precursor to the modern corporation. 
19 See THE ROMAN LAW READER 81 (F.H. Lawson ed., 1969). 
20 See generally Ron Harris, The Institutional Dynamics of Early Modern Eurasian Trade: The 
Commenda and the Corporation 1, 8-18 (Nov. 3, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1294095) (examining the development and dispersion pattern of the 
commenda).
21 See id. at 10. 
22 This arrangement was a practical one at a time when communications were difficult and slow.  It 
would also be practical today, where most businesses require expertise beyond that of ordinary 
investors. 
23 See Harris, supra note 20, at 11. 
24 See id. at 13. 
25 See id. at 10.
26 I use the terms “business” and “enterprise” to mean purposive human endeavor, not necessarily 
profit-making activities. 
27 The fact that sole proprietors, unlike all other business forms, do not segregate assets, has led to 
some difficulty in the conversion of sole proprietorships to LLCs.  Many state statutes provide for 
transfer by operation of law of the assets and liabilities of an existing entity to an LLC, but lack such a 
provision for sole proprietorships.  Courts have read into the statutes a comparable provision for sole 
proprietorships.  See, e.g., C & J Builders & Remodelers, LLC v. Geisenheimer, 733 A.2d 193 (Conn. 
1999) (solving the most immediate problem of transferring business assets and liabilities to the LLC, 
but raising a new problem – identifying the assets to be transferred). 
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in the first place, and so it is appropriate to view the asset pool as the core of the 
relationships involved.28  In addition, someone must be empowered to take care of 
the assets in the pool.  In a corporation, statutes provide that the board of directors 
manages the assets that make up the corporation.  In other entities, the persons who 
contribute assets to the pool designate someone at that time to make decisions 
affecting the assets.  If they fail to designate someone, the governing statutes provide 
a default custodian.  So far, this is consistent with current law.  Under the asset-pool 
approach, however, the designated managers would not be considered agents of 
anyone.  Rather, they would be empowered, by contract or statute, to act with 
respect to the pool of assets.29  They can bind it in contract or tort, transfer it, and 
otherwise deal with it as if they were its owners.30  They can also confer similar 
powers on others.  The assets are available to satisfy liabilities arising from the acts of 
the managers with respect to the assets.  Profits from the assets are added to the 
pool, unless the contributors have otherwise agreed.31  The theoretical owners of the 
assets are the investors, not the corporation or entity.32
The asset-pool approach explains the phenomenon of corporate officers and 
directors owing fiduciary duties to shareholders who are not their principals.33  The 
duty of the manager to the contributors is “fiduciary” in a sense, because a person 
holding another’s property for the other’s benefit is generally, unless otherwise 
agreed, a fiduciary.34  But the nature of those duties is determined with reference to 
that particular relationship, not by agency law.  Because they are custodians of the 
fund, managers would be held to the duty of loyalty applicable to holders of 
28 Cf. WEBER, supra note 15, at 75 (discussing examples of the partnership as “simply a fund”); and 
WEBER, supra note 15, at 68 (quoting a Genoan charter of 1165 in which the parties agree that the 
managing partner “is obligated to carry this whole partnership to Bugia, to put it to work. . ..”). 
29 This approach probably closely resembles the actual expectations of many parties in closely-held 
corporations. 
30 Managers in this scheme are obviously analogous to trustees, but to apply trust law to business 
organizations would be, once again, to subject relationships to legal rules designed for a different set 
of circumstances.  Investors have always been free to create a trust if they chose to do so; however, 
few have done so, which suggests that trust law does not provide a desirable set of rules for business 
associations.  Another analogy is a bailment, where the bailor has agreed not to seek a return of the 
bailed property until some specified event, such as dissolution. 
31 Cf. WEBER, supra note 15, at 70 (describing the societas maris).
32 To avoid many practical problems, the legal owner of the assets would continue to be the entity. 
33 See Paula J. Dalley, Shareholder (and Director) Fiduciary Duties and Shareholder Activism, 8 HOUS. BUS. &
TAX L.J. 301, 311-14 (2008). 
34 See Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9 (Del. 1998) (“An underlying premise for the imposition of 
fiduciary duties is a separation of legal control from beneficial ownership”). 
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constructive trusts when they are dealing with the assets in the fund.35  In the 
absence of agreement, the managers would have no power or authority with respect 
to the ownership of the assets in the fund or the relations among the owners inter se.36
Thus, if the managers act so as to affect the ultimate ownership of the assets or alter 
the governance structure, those actions would be officious and therefore invalid, if 
not tortious, as an interference with another’s property or contract right, unless the 
contributors have expressly or impliedly consented to the managers’ participation in 
those decisions.  In practice, this would mean that such actions by the managers 
would be very closely scrutinized.  Similarly, the selection of new or continuing 
managers by the contributors would be strongly protected from interference.  The 
managers themselves should have little role in the process by which successor 
managers are chosen, such as the election of directors, other than providing 
information and agreeing to the terms of their own service. 
With respect to the managers’ powers, these too should be determined by 
reference to the contributor-custodian relationship.  The contributors have agreed to 
risk these assets in the hands of the managers, with the expectation that the 
managers will engage in a more or less specified business.  The assets were not put at 
risk with respect to other businesses – that is, activities that do not involve the assets 
in the pool or that involve the assets in a venture outside the scope of the 
contribution.  There will, of course, be difficult determinations about the precise 
delineation of the scope of the contribution, even if the parties have entered into an 
express agreement about it,37 but the determination of that scope should be by 
reference to the intent of the parties at the original creation of the venture.  The 
reasonable expectations of third parties dealing with managers should also be 
protected, because those expectations were, or should have been, part of the risk the 
contributors accepted when they created the venture.  Thus, rules such as those 
35 Decisions about how to use the property would be largely at the discretion of the managers, 
because this was presumably the intent of the parties in placing the assets in the custody of the 
manager.  This would maintain the current distinction applied in business associations between the 
duty of care and the duty of loyalty. 
36 Decisions affecting ownership would include issuing shares (i.e., dilution), entering into mergers or 
de-facto mergers, interfering with (or preferentially enabling) the sale of shares by a single 
shareholder, or expelling a partner or member.  Decisions affecting relations among the owners would 
include changes to bylaws or operating agreements and actions affecting voting rights or policies.  
Thus, under the asset-pool approach, the distinction between management and governance described 
in Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp. would have to be maintained.  See 564 A.2d 651, 660 (Del. Ch. 1988) 
(distinguishing matter that “does not involve the exercise of the corporation’s power over its property, or 
with respect to its rights or obligations” from matter that “involves allocation, between shareholders 
as a class and the board, of effective power with respect to governance of the corporation.”) 
(emphasis in original). 
37Even if it were possible to draft an agreement defining the scope of the business in sufficient detail 
to answer all disagreements, such an agreement would have very high transactional costs. 
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governing apparent authority and estoppel would continue in practical effect, 
although removed from their agency law packaging. 
How would the law be different if it were based on the asset-pool approach?  
The business judgment rule would continue to apply, because the shareholders, as 
contributors, assigned management power to the board when they created the asset 
pool.  But the board, in dealing with the asset pool, would be restricted by the 
original contract.  In consequence, the law would include some notion similar to the 
old ultra vires doctrine, and persons forming new pools of assets would be 
encouraged to make clear their understanding of the limits of the venture.  Where 
the manager is an equity participant in the venture, as in the commenda, the members 
would not have the power to remove him or her without cause.  In other cases, 
where the manager’s participation in the investment is not an essential part of the 
manager-investor relationship, the members would be free to remove the managers 
at will.  With respect to corporations, the law should facilitate the removal of 
directors by shareholders, unless the directors were expected to participate as directors
in the profit of the venture.38  This is not ordinarily true in corporations today; 
however, the change in law might precipitate a change in that custom. 
The asset-pool approach would provide a solution to the problems addressed 
in at least four of the papers that are part of this Roundtable.  Professor Heminway 
explores a manager’s duty to disclose personal information to shareholders.39  Under 
agency law, it is hard to justify many of the existing mandatory disclosure obligations 
because managers do not owe duties to the shareholders.40  If the shareholders are 
viewed as contributors to an asset pool and the managers are viewed as their chosen 
custodians, the obligation of the managers to disclose material information is 
obvious – it would be a term, express or default, of the contributor-custodian 
agreement.  Professor Simmons notes the under-theorized and undervalued role of 
in-house counsel in corporate governance.41  That state of affairs reflects the 
awkward position of in-house lawyers, whose client does not exist and therefore 
38 Courts are already required to distinguish these two situations.  See Merola v. Exergen Corp., 668 
N.E.2d 351, 354 (Mass. 1996) (explaining the difference between employee-stockholders, who are not 
entitled to enhanced protection as minority shareholders, and minority shareholders, who are so 
entitled). 
39 See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Martha’s (and Steve’s) Good Faith: An Officer’s Duty of Loyalty at the 
Intersection of Good Faith and Candor, 11 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. (forthcoming Dec. 2009). 
40 The disclosure requirements of the Federal securities laws fill a gap in state corporate law, which 
requires that managers provide information to shareholders only in limited situations.  See generally
Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10-11 (Del. 1998) (explaining the disclosure requirements within 
Delaware General Corporation Law). 
41 See Omari Scott Simmons, The Under-Examination of In-House Counsel, 11 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J.
BUS. L. (forthcoming Dec. 2009). 
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cannot act as the client in the lawyer-client relationship.  Instead, in-house counsel 
must interact with natural persons who are not their clients and whose interests 
diverge from, and perhaps conflict with, the interests of the lawyer’s nominal client.  
If the law abandons its illogical vision of the entity as the principal, we can re-
conceive the position of in-house counsel, whose job would be acting for the benefit 
of the owners of the asset pool, and whose client would be the shareholders.42
The asset-pool approach would be most useful in dealing with corporate 
governance issues that are intractable under current law.  Professors Fairfax and 
Bruner explore the uncertainties about, and problems of, the shareholders’ power to 
alter the governance mechanisms of the corporation.43  The specific issues they 
address are instances of a broader problem that Professor Bruner describes as the 
law’s ambivalence toward shareholder governance.44  That problem results from and 
reflects the imposition of agency law on the corporation, where the principal does 
not actually exist and the true parties in interest – the shareholders – have no legal 
status at all.  Under an asset-pool approach, where the board is the custodian of 
assets pursuant to a contractual delegation by the shareholders, the shareholders, and 
only the shareholders, would control governance decisions.45  The practical 
difficulties of coordinating shareholder action, including the rational apathy 
problem,46 would be addressed by placing a contractual or legal obligation on the 
managers to facilitate shareholder action, but the managers would have no other role 
in governance.47
The law of business associations would look very different if it jettisoned 
agency law and adopted a new set of doctrines based on the conception of the 
business association as an asset pool.  Such a change in law would impose high costs 
on existing businesses.  It is possible, therefore, that agency law is actually the best 
legal regime despite the fact that it is a poor fit for many business associations.  
42 As in the case of shareholder control of governance, the managers would have the contractual or 
legal obligation to represent the shareholders’ interests with counsel when it is impractical for the 
shareholders to do so directly. 
43 See Christopher M. Bruner, Shareholder Bylaws and the Delaware Corporation, 11 TRANSACTIONS: TENN.
J. BUS. L. (forthcoming Dec. 2009); Lisa M. Fairfax, Delaware’s New Proxy Access: Much Ado About 
Nothing?, 11 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. (forthcoming Dec. 2009). 
44 See Bruner, supra note 43, at n.44 and accompanying text. 
45 This is also true regarding fundamental changes to the asset pool, such as mergers and similar 
transactions. 
46 See Lisa M. Fairfax, The Future of Shareholder Democracy, 84 IND. L.J. 1259, 1268-73 (2009). 
47 Under this approach, as under current law, dissenting shareholders must be protected if the terms 
of the original contract are to be changed without their consent.  The important point here is that, 
unlike current law, the board of directors would not be part of that process.  One appropriate 
protection might be expanded appraisal and buyout rights. 
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Consideration of the alternative, however, may help illuminate the benefits, as well as 
the problems, of the regime at hand.
